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"MONT BLANC" AND THE SUBLIMITY OF MATERIALITY
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One of the ironies of poststructuralism's critique of logocentrism, a project that has the potential to progressively deconstruct anthropocentric subjectivity, is that it often fails to fully actualize this potential due to a problematic conflation of materiality and linguistic diffirance. A critical focus on language as the chief means of subverting dominant paradigms frequently has the effect of rewriting the subject as an ideally free-floating "text" existing in a purely cultural field, independent from, yet simultaneously constructing the material world via language games. Contemporary critics such as Brian Massumi observe that in the process a certain "cultural solipsism" is inadvertently reproduced whereby nonhuman domains (and subjects) are seen as significant only in terms of how they are linguistically constructed by humans.1 Thus, "theoretical moves aimed at ending the Human end up making human culture the measure and meaning of all things, in a kind of unfettered anthropomorphism" (Massumi, 100) . During the past decade, dissatisfaction with unresolved traces of philosophical idealism in poststructuralist thought has been fueled by a growing awareness of ecological decline occurring in the earth's physical biosphere. Global warming, melting of the polar icecaps and glaciers, ozone depletion, unprecedented extinction rates in nonhuman species, and explosive human population growth all seem to demand more sustainable constructions of "nature" and materiality that do not simply construe the real as a domain that is wholly determined by human beings but that in turn has no appreciable effect on the evolution of culture. This is not to advocate an unmediated bridging of the gap between material and will explore Niklas Luhmann's theory of communication as a possible framework for thinking issues of materiality that avoids the extremes of absolute constructivism on the one hand and naive realism on the other. Today's ecocritics must find more productive ways to address language's constitutive role in establishing the contours of meaning even as they maintain that signs do not exhaust (or fully determine) our ways of experiencing nature as an "outside" to communication systems. As a complex account of communication's autopoiesis (self-generation) in response to potentially infinite ways of processing meaning in the world, systems theory provides not so much an escape from the "prison house" of language as a way to rethink its limits, the way linguistic closure necessitates blindness and multiple observation but also leaves open the world as a material domain that necessarily exceeds our cultural constructions.2
Furthermore, a systems-theoretical approach to communication sheds new light on an already existing discourse that addresses the limit between language and its outside: the romantic sublime. As one of the most famous (and infamous) articulations of the boundary between culture and nature in the modern era and the project of bridging this divide, it is not surprising that critics have frequently turned to this aesthetic as evidence of a proto-ecological awareness among nineteenth-century poets. Jonathan Bate, for example, considers the romantic sublime to be ecologically progressive because, as evidenced in Wordsworth's poetry, it succeeds in its aim to unproblematically bridge human culture and nature, language and its material referent. During the early nineties, Bate called for a reevaluation of the romantic sublime as an ethos that could provide contemporary society with an ethical grounding for environmental praxis. In "Toward Green Romanticism," he claims that nature today must be regarded as it was by the Romantics, "with wonder and reverence, not rapaciousness" (67). In this regard, he feels the romantic sublime is instructive because it "conveys a sense of the insignificance, the smallness, of man. It offers a necessary humbling, a first step toward the knowledge that humankind is not self-sufficient." Unfortunately, this reading overlooks the fact that what might be termed the "anthropocentric sublime" operating in Wordsworth's texts represents a dialectic wherein the subject is only temporarily "humbled" before nature; the second moment in this exchange is typically one in which the subject's mind and/or imagination is exalted above nature, transcending anything it encounters in the material world. As Marjorie Levinson puts it in "Pre-and Post-Dialectical Materialisms: Modeling Praxis without Subjects and Objects," this articulation of the sublime "supports the wide range of discourses associated with the project of modernity" in that it "features the profitable transformation of nature and matter by a human . . . agency which is both materially empowered by this process and refined into ever increasing self-awareness and self-possession" (114). Seen through the framework of Luhmannian systems theory, the anthropocentric sublime is ultimately self-reflexive insofar as it attempts to thematize the consciousness of isolated individuals (psychic systems) and paradoxically employs incommunicability as a way of reproducing communication. In this way, the deployment of the sublime in firstgeneration romantic poetry signals not so much the mind's successful union with nature but the growing autonomy of art as a social system in the age of modernity. This growing autonomy, however, is counterbalanced in early romantic texts by what de Man calls a "nostalgia for the natural object," a drive to restore a sense of knowable linguistic origin to language that mirrors the self-evident origin of natural objects ("Intentional Structure," 6). This essentially religious impulse to unify nature and language under the authority of a transcendental signified not only motivates Wordsworth's quest to see in nature the image of a "mighty mind ... that feeds upon infinity" in The Prelude (lines 70-71 in book 13 of 1805 version) but also informs Coleridge's invocation of nature's "voice" as an echo of the Divine in poems like "Hymn before Sun-rise, in the Vale of Chamouni." Hence, in the anthropocentric sublime, nature is represented as something that essentially gratifies human needs (either as a foil for the imagination or something that functions analogously to the Book of God) and is denied a material autonomy beyond human desire or use value. As such, this mode of sublimity can hardly provide an ethical grounding for more responsible environmental praxis.
But there is another aspect of sublimity that may be ironically "useful" to ecological thinking: silence. It is no coincidence that silence figures prominently in ecocriticism, as it has in criticism that seeks to restore voice to modernity's silenced others.3 However, there is something to be said for silence as positive withholding, as a mode interpretation of the Kantian sublime, the "dismemberment" of nature as an articulated body corresponds to the fragmentation of language as a unified field via a process that heralds the failure of the aesthetic, its "fall" from referential grace. Systems theory, in contrast, does not claim that the disunity of modern social systems necessitates a corresponding dismemberment of natural or bodily domains; in fact, language's "fall" from the symbolic is fortunate insofar as it heralds an age that does not presume that the real is wholly determined by discourse, or, in de Man's parlance, that "the bottom line ... is the prosaic materiality of the letter" (90).
THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC SUBLIME AND AUTOPOIETIC COMMUNICATION
The first wave of romantic poets heralded the sublime as a discourse intended to close the gap between the human mind and nature. The historical causes of this rift were many, including the rise of humanist subjectivity and of modern science. Broadly speaking, Luhmann's theory is an attempt to come to terms with the epistemological consequences of modernity.5 He locates the eighteenth century as a period in which Western society, previously organized on a largely stratified and hierarchical model, differentiated into a more horizontal field occupied by social systems whose unity could no longer be referred to a central locus point (a king, the church, God). Society as totalizing Leviathan becomes modern society's dispersed collection of functionally distinct subsystems, each organized around a symbolically generated media code. For Luhmann, social systems are first and foremost communication systems, each built around a distinction that enables the system to establish its boundaries in order to process environmental complexity in a meaningful way. Each subsystem functions as a "focus for comparison," a way of marking a reference problem such that "multiple solutions can be compared" while at the same time "the problem remains open for further selections and substitutions" (Art as a Social System, 138). Modern society is therefore differentiated into political, economic, scientific, legal, and artistic subsystems that operate via distinctions like power/lack of power, payment/no payment, true/false, just/unjust, and (in the case of art) communicability/incommunicability or real/imaginary. These distinctions allow social systems to process meaning, steer their operations, and increase their internal complexity to cope effectively with the environmental complexity produced by other social systems. However, an important consequence of autopoiesis is that a system must remain closed on the level of its first-order operations; that is, although a system can observe the constitutive difference guiding other communication systems, it must necessarily remain blind to its own constitutive code on the level of There is much to be unpacked from Schwanitz's remarks here, but the most apropos for an investigation of the anthropocentric sublime is the insight that this aesthetic, although purporting to be an attempt to communicate the incommunicable in nature, usually ends up thematizing the incommunicability of individual consciousness. This is why, in Schwanitz's reading, the romantic poet addresses natural objects as things that cannot take part in communication, let alone generate "dissent." The point of such communication is not to bridge the gap between nature and psychic systems but to emphasize the isolation of "authentic," incommunicable consciousness. One way of interpreting the sublime, then, is as a discourse that ironically points to nature as something "outside" of social systems only to emphasize communication's inability to articulate the ultimate "inside" of human perception. This would explain why the anthropocentric sublime consistently emphasizes the primacy of human thought in the sublime experience. Ferguson critiques what she claims is Shelley's failure in this project, the way in which his text doesn't "destroy the mountain's symbolic value, but merely inverts it" by enacting the "impossibility of seeing the mountain as alien" (204) via a series of personifications, failed attempts to address the landscape as a "subject" with whom he can "speak familiarly" (208). Shelley's "love" for the mountain therefore amounts to a kind of dialectical projection, a means of asserting his own existence via an imagined antitype. Thus, Ferguson reads the poem's concluding question as a largely rhetorical one, a way for the poetic subject to assert his mind's necessary representation of the mountain via art in the way a lover might remind his estranged partner that she would be nothing without him (211).
Applying these insights to the
Although Ferguson's reading is important because it broaches the question of Shelley's views on materiality, it is also compromised
by the fact that it doesn't thoroughly account for the intertextuality at work in "Mont Blanc," the way the poem activates redundancies with previous poetic configurations of the sublime primarily to permit the emergence of new forms. Ferguson therefore asserts that a mode of symbolism is at work in Shelley's thought that is in fact more characteristic of earlier writers. Indeed, as Nigel Leask convincingly argues in "Mont Blanc's Mysterious Voice: Shelley and Huttonian Earth Science," Shelley draws upon the latest developments in early nineteenth-century geology in order to critique earlier representations of sublimity that had contributed to Mont Blanc's popular reception as an emblem of Christian catastrophism, the view that the mountain bore traces of the biblical flood and was the product of either a wrathful or benign God. In opposition to geologists who supported this "Neptunist" view that earth formation resulted from of a single, anomalous catastrophe, "Mont Blanc" endorses the "Vulcanist" position that destruction occurs as a constant over time through explosive eruptions that are simply part of natural, evolutionary processes, not divine intervention. In Shelley's time, the latter theory caused great controversy because it suggested that nature was not teleological and that materiality could not be conveniently "read" as the text of a creator. As we shall see, this is one way that "Mont Blanc" undermines faith in language's ability to forge a symbolic unity between the human mind and nature, underscoring art's autopoietic function instead.
In order to capitalize on this insight in section 4, "Mont Blanc" performs a second-order observation on the symbolic's unifying function in order to actualize alternative ways of processing meaning. This is why the first section opens with images of the mind's unity with nature, where "The everlasting universe of things / Flows through the mind," lending human thought a splendor it could not assume in isolation, a splendor "but half its own" (1-6). These lines iterate Wordsworth's notion in "Tintern Abbey" that the mind "half creates" and " 
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